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ELIGIBILITY, TREATMENT, OR SOMETHING
IN-BETWEEN? PLAINTIFFS GET CREATIVE
TO GET PAST ERISA PREEMPTION
Linda P. McKenzie'
On July 1, 2005 a Bexar County, Texas jury, in the case of Smelik v.
Mann, awarded the husband and children of a deceased San Antonio
woman 7.4 million dollars in their wrongful death suit against the
woman's physician, his practice group, and Humana Health Plan of
Texas, Inc. (Humana).2  Humana was the Health Maintenance
Organization (HMO) that administered the health plan provided to
Joan Smelik.' Mrs. Smelik died of kidney failure, which the plaintiffs
claimed could have been prevented if Humana had simply followed its
own utilization management policies." The jury found Humana
responsible for thirty-five percent of the actual damages, 7.4 million
dollars. In addition, the defendants were ordered to pay punitive
damages of 1.6 million dollars, bringing Humana's total liability to the
plaintiffs to over four million dollars
The case garnered national attention largely because of its unusual
outcome with respect to Humana. While it is not uncommon for a
plaintiff to win a judgment based on the negligence of a health care
provider, it is quite remarkable when the judgment includes an
employer-sponsored health plan. Such an occurrence is notable
because the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), a
federal law that governs pension plans and welfare benefit plans
provided as a benefit of employment, preempts most state law causes
1. Associate, Jones Vargas, Las Vegas, Nevada. LL.M., Health Law,
University of Houston Law Center, 2006; J.D., University of Arizona, Rogers
College of Law, 2004; This article received first place in the 2006 Florida Bar
Association's William Trickel, Jr. Memorial Writing Award Competition. The
author thanks Professor David Pate for his invaluable insights and guidance.
2. Tom Bower, UPDATED: Jury Awards $7.4 Million in Humana HMO
Case, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, July 1, 2005, http://www.mysanantonio.com/
business/ stories/ MYSA070105.humana.en.63bf4d6a.htm.
3. Id.
4. Health Plan Lawsuit Watch, http://www.aishealth.com/ ManagedCare/
HMOLawsuitWatch/ Smelik vMann.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2007).
5. See Bower, supra note 2.
6. See id.
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of action against managed care entities . Avoiding federal preemption
is critical to a plaintiff's case because ERISA's remedial scheme limits
relief for damages to the cost of the treatment or service that was
denied by the health plan.8
The Supreme Court has held that any claim that could be construed
as a claim "to recover benefits due ... under the terms of [the] plan" is
subject to ERISA's limited remedies. 9  The Court has explicitly
determined that claims against an HMO for failing to authorize
medically necessary surgery and prescribed medication are, in essence,
no more than claims to recover benefits due under the plan. '° On the
other hand, the medical negligence of an HMO-employed physician is
not subject to ERISA preemption." The facts of the Humana case
(Smelik) did not fit neatly into either the denial of services or the
medical negligence category. The plaintiffs alleged that Humana failed
to identify Mrs. Smelik as a candidate for its case management
program, although multiple chronic medical conditions qualified her to
participate.'2 Case management combines elements of treatment and
eligibility decision making, blurring the distinction between state law
claims that are and are not subject to ERISA preemption. 3 The
outcome of the Smelik case was significant to the extent that it
appeared to carve out this previously unrecognized exception to the
7. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (2000).
8. Under ERISA, a plaintiff can recover the value of the medical treatment
that was denied. For example, in Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004),
plaintiff Juan Davila's HMO substituted a cheaper drug for the medication
prescribed by his physician. As a result, Mr. Davila suffered internal bleeding and
incurred medical expense, pain and suffering. See id. at 204-05. See also James W.
Kim, Managed Care Liability, ERISA Preemption, and State "Right to Sue"
Legislation in Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 36 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 651, 681 (2005).
Where state law would have permitted Davila to recover for his injuries, the
remedy under ERISA was the value of the denied benefit, the difference in cost
between the drug that was prescribed and the drug his HMO authorized. See
Davila, 542 U.S. at 209, 210. For an excellent discussion of Davila, see Kim, supra.
9. See Davila, 542 U.S. at 210 (citation omitted).
10. See id. at 210-14.
11. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 214 (2000).
12. Insurance Newscast, Jury Awards 7.4 Million in Wrongful Death Lawsuit
Against Humana HMO, http://www.insurancebroadcasting.com/072205.htm (last
visited Apr. 24, 2007).
13. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 228 (2000). Eligibility decisions are
based on whether a plan provides coverage for a particular condition whereas
treatment decisions entail choices about how to diagnose or treat a condition. See
infra Part IV.
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application of ERISA. For reasons not disclosed, however, Humana
settled the case with Joan Smelik's family while its appeal was
pending.14  Because so many managed care organizations employ
medical case management, it will likely be only a matter of time before
another plaintiff claims that his or her HMO's failure to provide these
services caused damages. Perhaps a future case will result in an
appellate opinion addressing whether ERISA preemption applies in
this circumstance.
This article analyzes ERISA's impact on employee welfare benefit
plans and on health plans in particular. It concentrates on the two
ERISA provisions that, as interpreted by the Court, combine to
significantly weaken an injured plaintiff's ability to obtain proper
retribution: section 502(a) governs remedies and section 514 expressly
authorizes federal preemption. Part I provides a brief overview of the
political climate at the time ERISA was enacted and discuss the
purpose of the Act. Part If discusses ERISA's express preemption and
the two additional types of preemption identified by the Supreme
Court. Part III examines ERISA's remedial scheme and the Supreme
Court's related jurisprudence. Part IV reviews ERISA in the health
care context. Finally, Part V analyzes the Court's holdings that have
restricted a plaintiff's potential remedies and suggests ways in which
plaintiffs may still be indemnified.
PART I. ERISA HISTORY
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act in 1974"s out of concern over the rapid growth of employee
pension and benefit plans 6 and the lack of safeguards to protect
workers from the loss of promised benefits when these plans failed.
17
14. On March 1, 2006, the parties "filed a joint motion stating they have fully
resolved and settled all issues in dispute." The case was dismissed with prejudice.
Humana Health Plans of Tex., Inc. v. Smelik, No. 04-05-00738-CV, 2006 WL
467987, at *1 (Tex. App.- San Antonio Mar. 1 2006).
15. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (2000)).
16. Jana K. Strain and Eleanor D. Kinney, The Road Paved With Good
Intentions: Problems and Potential for Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance
Under ERISA, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 29, 30 (1999) ("Between 1945 and 1984, the
number of workers covered by private pension and employee benefit plans
increased from 6.4 million to 65 million, and the value of these plans increased
from $5.4 billion in assets to over $900 billion." (footnote omitted)).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000) ("The congress finds that .. .despite the
enormous growth in such plans many employees with long years of employment
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In particular, Congress was alarmed by the failure of some large
pension plans, which resulted in employees facing retirement without
their anticipated earned pension benefits.' 8 For at least a decade prior
to enacting ERISA, both the legislative and executive branches of the
federal government conducted inquiries into the affairs of pension and
benefit plans.1 9  The investigations revealed that plans were not
operating in a way that served the interests of plan beneficiaries. For
example, the Senate's McClellan Committee, led by Robert F.
Kennedy, identified widespread misuse of plan funds by labor unions.2°
The results of the investigations were disturbing to Congress on two
grounds. First, misuse of pension plan funds could result in a plan
becoming insolvent and an employer defaulting on its pension
promise.2" Second, persons responsible for managing plan assets could
2improperly deny payment for promised benefits.
Congress' stated purpose for enacting ERISA was to safeguard the
interests of employees and their beneficiaries who participated in
pension and benefit plans from default risk and plan mismanagement.
2 3
Congress intended to maximize employee protection by modeling
ERISA on existing trust law and providing open access to the federal
courts. 24 Years later, the Court explained that allowing various state
are losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in
such plans; that owing to the inadequacy of current minimum standards, the
soundness and stability of plans with respect to adequate funds to pay promised
benefits may be endangered; that owing to the termination of plans before
requisite funds have been accumulated, employees and their beneficiaries have
been deprived of anticipated benefits .. ").
18. John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable": The Supreme
Court's Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1317, 1322 (2003) (footnote omitted) (noting that in 1963, Studebaker defaulted on
its pension plan, leaving several thousand retirees and workers without pension
benefits).
19. Id. at 1321-22 (noting that ERISA enactment was preceded by "more than
a decade of investigations . . .by Congress, presidential commissions, and the
Departments of Labor, Justice, and Treasury." Id. (footnote omitted)).
20. Id. at 1324. (noting that the committee found "looting of plan funds
through sweetheart deals, kickbacks, and various forms of cronyism." Id. (footnote
omitted)).
21. See id. at 1322-23.
22. See Langbein, supra note 18, at 1323-24.
23. See id. at 1322.
24. See id. at 1324-25, 1331.
2007]
276 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy[Vol. XXIII:272
causes of action for claims "within the scope of 502(a) would pose an
obstacle to these purposes and objectives of Congress.,
25
The Court's emphasis on ERISA's secondary purpose has come at
the expense of the Act's stated primary purpose. Although drafted
primarily to protect the interests of employees in their pension and
benefit plans, ERISA often erects insurmountable barriers to
employees' claims against these plans.26 The result is that a beneficiary
sustaining damages as a result of his health plan's denial of a covered
benefit often has no adequate remedy under state or federal law.27
PART II. ERISA PREEMPTION
The Court has instructed that ERISA has three separate preemption
mechanisms. 28 Section 514 expressly preempts state laws that "relate
to" ERISA-regulated benefit plans.' 9 In addition, the Court has
recognized the power of section 502(a) to preempt "any state-law
cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA
civil enforcement remedy .... "3 0
A. Section 514 Ordinary / Conflict Preemption
ERISA, section 514(a) reads: "Except as provided in subsection (b)
of this section, the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of
this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan .... ""
25. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Supreme Court Limits Lawsuits Against
Managed Care Organizations, HEALTH AFFAIRS - WEB EXCLUSIVE W4-417, W4-
420 (2004), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.417v1.pdf
(quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1985)).
26. See Davila, 542 U.S. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)("Because the Court
has coupled an encompassing interpretation of ERISA's preemptive force with a
cramped construction of the 'equitable relief' allowable under § 502(a)(3), a
'regulatory vacuum' exists: '[V]irtually all state law remedies are preempted but
very few federal substitutes are provided."' (quoting DiFelice v. Aetna U.S.
Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 456-57 (3rd Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring))).
27. See id.
28. See N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995) ("Our past cases have recognized that the Supremacy
Clause . . .may entail pre-emption of state law either by express provision, by
implication, or by a conflict between federal and state law.")
29. See 29 U.S.C.A.. §1144(a) (West 1999).
30. Davila, 542 U.S. at 200-01.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1999).
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The Court initially construed section 514(a)'s "relate to" language
broadly, based on congressional intent to simplify plan
administration.32 Congress, the Court reasoned, intended the words to
have broad meaning, because it "reject[ed] more limited pre-emption
language that would have made the clause 'applicable only to state
laws relating to the specific subjects covered by ERISA."'33 In its first
interpretation of "relate to" the Court found that 514(a) applied to
laws that directly regulated pension plans as well as laws that merely
had an indirect affect on them.34  When given another early
opportunity to delineate the realm of 514(a) preemption, the Court
concluded that a law sufficiently relates to a benefit plan if it has "a
connection with or reference to such a plan."35
Over time the Supreme Court withdrew from its expansive reading
of section 514(a), and in 1995 presumed that Congress did not to
intend to preempt state law.3" The Court noted that the language
limiting ERISA preemption to "all State laws insofar as they ... relate
to any employee benefit plan," was so broad that it could be construed
not to serve as a limitation at all.37 The Court found the text
"unhelpful" and determined to "look instead to the objectives of the
ERISA statute" to ascertain Congress' intent as to the "scope of the
state law that . . . would survive [preemption]., 3' The Court held in
this 1995 case that section 514 was intended to preempt only state laws
that significantly affect the structure or administration of ERISA
plans.3 9
32. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
33. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon , 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990) (quoting
Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98 (1983)).
The Court identified two exceptions that "relate to" preemption: a state law that
may burden the administration of a plan, or a "generally applicable statute that
makes no reference to, or indeed functions irrespective of, the existence of an
ERISA plan." Id. at 139.
34. Jost, supra note 25, W4-419 (citing Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,
451 U.S. 504,523 (1980)).
35. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97 (footnote omitted).
36. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. at 654. ("[W]e have never assumed lightly that
Congress has derogated state regulation, but instead have addressed claims of pre-
emption with the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant
state law.").
37. Id. at 655.
38. Id. at 656.
39. Id. at 668. ("We acknowledge that a state law might produce such acute,
albeit indirect, economic effects, by intent or otherwise, as to force an ERISA plan
to adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage or effectively restrict its choice
2007]
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Section 514 contains a "saving clause," which exempts from
preemption laws that regulate insurance, banking, or securities.4 The
saving clause has been applied to state laws that mandate minimum
health insurance benefits,4 ' and laws that require all insurers in the• 42
state to pay for the services of a certain type of health care provider.
Another provision of 514, the "deemer clause," clarifies the saving
clause. It states that an employee benefit plan covered by ERISA may
not "be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer ... or to
be engaged in the business of insurance ... for purposes of any law of
any State purporting to regulate insurance companies [or] insurance
contracts . . . ,,4' The effect of the deemer clause has been to prevent
state law suits against self-insured plans." For this discrete subset of
plans, the deemer clause has ensured consistent government regulation
while also minimizing risk associated with costly state court litigation.
The deemer clause is evidence of Congress' efforts to balance
competing policies underlying ERISA.
The Supreme Court has commented on the apparent incongruence
between the general preemption clause and the saving clause.4 1 "The
general pre-emption clause broadly pre-empts state law[s]" that relate
to benefit plans while the equally broad saving clause gives authority
back to the states "over much of the same regulation.', 46 Again, this is
evidence of the tension in the policies that underlie ERISA: the need
to protect beneficiaries' interests while making administration and
compliance simple enough that employers choose to offer employment
benefit plans. The Court has attempted to find the balance that
Congress intended.
of insurers, and that such a state law might indeed be pre-empted under § 514."
(citations omitted)).
40. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985).
41. Id. at 758.
42. See Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003).
43. Id. at 336 n.1 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B))).
44. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990) ("We read the deemer
clause to exempt self-funded ERISA plans from state laws that 'regulat[e]
insurance' within the meaning of the saving clause.") Id. at 61.
45. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 739-40 (noting that "[tihe two pre-emption
sections, while clear enough on their faces, perhaps are not a model of legislative
drafting .... Id. at 739.).
46. Id. at 739-40. ("For while Congress occasionally decides to return to the
States what it has previously taken away, it does not normally do both at the same
time." Id. at 740).
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B. 502(a)'s Two Preemption Doctrines
Although it does not specifically mention preemption, the Supreme
Court has nonetheless construed section 502(a) to have extremely
broad preemptive power. The Court has held that the careful crafting
of 502(a)'s six civil enforcement provisions, listed immediately below,
"provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize
other remedies . . . 4 Therefore, the Court has held that state
contract, tort and statutory claims that could have been brought as
claims for benefits or for breach of fiduciary duty are preempted by
section 502(a).49
A second and distinct type of preemption emanating from 502(a) is
termed "complete preemption." Not a true preemption doctrine,
complete preemption is more accurately described as a rule of federal
jurisdiction. ° Complete preemption serves to recharacterize a state
law claim into one arising under federal law. 5' As such, the claim is
removable by a defendant to federal court. According to the Court,
sometimes Congress "so completely pre-empt[s] a particular area [of
law] that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is
necessarily federal in character.,
53
I. Section 502 Preemption
Section 502(a) provides:
A civil action may be brought-
(1) by a participant or beneficiary-
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this
section [concerning requests to the administrator for
information], or(B) to recover benefits due to him
under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under
47. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1987).
48. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 54 (quoting Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473
U.S. 134, 146 (1985)).
49. See Jost, supra note 25, at W4-20-W4-21 (quoting Russell, 473 U.S. 134,
146). See also Taylor, 481 U.S. at 60 (noting that it held in Dedeaux "that state
common law causes of action asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits
under an employee benefit plan regulated by [ERISA] are pre-empted by the
Act.").
50. BARRY R. FURROW ET. AL., HEALTH LAW 655 (5th ed. 2004).
51. See Taylor, 481 U.S. at 63-65.
52. See id. at 66-67.
53. id.. at 63-64.
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the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future
benefits under the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or
fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 1109 of this
title [breach of fiduciary duty];
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any
provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or
(B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief
(i) to redress such violations or
(ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or
the terms of the plan;
(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for
appropriate relief in the case of a violation of 1025(c) of this
title [information to be furnished to participants];
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this
subsection, by the Secretary
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any
provision of this subchapter, or
(B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief
(i) to redress such violation or
(ii) to enforce any provision of this subchapter;
(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under
subsection (i) of this section. 4
With these civil enforcement provisions in mind, we now turn to case
law involving section 502 preemption. Pilot Life Insurance Co. v.
Dedeaux involved an employee who injured his back while on the job.55
He was covered under an ERISA governed disability insurance plan.
Pilot Life Insurance, honored his initial claim for coverage but
subsequently terminated his benefits. 5' The employee brought suit in
federal court under diversity of citizenship jurisdiction alleging threeS 57
state law causes of action. The district court granted Pilot Life's
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that ERISA pre-empted
54. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a) (West 1999).
55. Dedaux, 481 U.S. at 43.
56. Id.
57. Id. State law claims included: "Tortuous Breach of Contract; Breach of
Fiduciary Duties; and Fraud in the Inducement." Id. (quotation and citation
omitted).
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all of the plaintiff's claims.58 The Fifth Circuit reversed and Pilot Life
appealed.5 9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether ERISA
preempts state common law causes of action alleging improper
processing of a claim for benefits.60 Interpreting § 514 broadly, the
Court found that the state law causes of action at issue, "relate[d] to" a
benefit plan.6' The Court next applied several criteria62 for
determining whether a law "regulates" insurance and concluded that
the state law did not.63 The inquiry did not end at this point; rather, the
Court examined evidence of legislative intent,6 including the
statements of legislative sponsors of ERISA65 and portions of the
Congressional Conference Committee's record on ERISA.6 6  The
Court highlighted the fact that the Conference Committee rejected a
more limited preemption clause in favor of the expansive language it
ultimately adopted."' Given the structure of ERISA's civil
enforcement provisions and the legislative history, 68 the Court
concluded that the remedies available in section 502 were intended to
be exclusive. 69 As a result of this determination, any state law that
58. Id. at 44.
59. Id.
60. Dedaux, 481 U.S. at 43.
61. Id. at 47-48.
62. Such as "the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk" or if
there is a limitation of the practice to those within the insurance industry. Id. at
48-49.
63. See id. at 49-50. These criteria were later abandoned in Miller, 538 U.S. at
341-42.
64. Id. at 45-46. ("[W]hether a certain state action is preempted depends on
congressional intent. The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone." Id. at
45(quotation and citations omitted)).
65. See Dedaux, 481 U.S. at 46. Senator Harrison Williams, while on the floor
of the Senate, said Congress intended the "substantive and enforcement provisions
• . .to preempt the field for Federal regulations . . . [and for the] principle of
preemption to apply in its broadest sense." Id. at 46 (citation omitted).
66. Id. (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98).
67. Id. (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98).
68. Congress compared § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA) to ERISA's civil enforcement scheme, observing that § 301 has a
"preemptive force so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action. .
Id. at 55-56.
69. Id. at 54. ("Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it
simply forgot to incorporate expressly." (quoting Russell, 473 U.S. at 146 )
(emphasis in original)).
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authorizes a remedy not available in 502(a) is automatically
preempted.0
II. Complete Preemption Under Section 502(a)
In Metropolitan Life v. Taylor, the plaintiff brought an action in state
court alleging breach of contract against the administrator of his
employment-related disability insurance plan.7' Metropolitan Life
removed the case to federal court, claiming federal question
jurisdiction under ERISA. The district court found the case properly
removable and granted the defendant's summary judgment motion on
the merits.73 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed,
finding "that the District Court lacked removal jurisdiction.,
74
United States Code provides that unless "otherwise expressly
provided ... any civil action brought in a State court of which the
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be
removed by the defendant . . . . 7 Federal courts have original
jurisdiction over cases "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States., 76 Generally, determining if a claim arises under
federal law, and is thus removable to federal court, depends on
whether the plaintiff's complaint explicitly raises federal claims.77
ERISA preemption, on the other hand, is a federal defense against a
state law claim. 78 As such, it provides insufficient justification to
remove a case to federal court. 9
In Taylor, the Court applied a common law corollary of the well-
pleaded complaint rule, which holds that "Congress may so completely
pre-empt a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select
group of claims is necessarily federal in character."80  While rarely
applied, complete preemption allows a defendant to remove an action
70. See Dedaux, 481 U.S. at 61.
71. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
72. Id. at 61. Plaintiff also alleged wrongful termination and wrongful failure
to promote him in retaliation for an earlier worker's compensation claim. Taylor
asked for compensatory damages for money owed him, compensation for mental
anguish, and immediate reimplementation of benefits and insurance coverage. Id.
73. Id. at 61-62.
74. Id. at 62.
75. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(a) (West 2006).
76. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 2006).
77. See Taylor, 481 U.S. at 63.
78. See id. at 63.
79. See id.
80. Id. at 63-64.
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to federal court even though no federal claims were stated in the
plaintiff's complaint." In 1968, the Court applied this principle to
claims brought under section 301 of the LMRA.n The Taylor Court
found distinct similarities between the language in section 301 of
LMRA and section 502 of ERISA."
3 Based on policy considerations 8
4
and the notably similar language of the two acts,85 the Court extended
the Avco principle to state law suits displaced by ERISA §
502(a)(1)(B).16 The effect of this jurisprudence was to "recharacterize
the state law complaint" into an action arising under federal law,
thereby conferring original jurisdiction upon the federal courts.87
PART III. ERISA's REMEDIAL SCHEME
ERISA section 502(a) defines who may bring a civil action, specifies
the allowed purposes for bringing an action, and describes available
remedies. The Court frequently praises section 502 as a model of
draftsmanship.8 9 In Dedeaux, the Court noted "[t]he deliberate care
with which ERISA's civil enforcement remedies were drafted and the
balancing of policies embodied in its choice of remedies argue strongly
for the conclusion that ERISA's civil enforcement remedies were
81. Id. at 67.
82. Id. at 64 (citing Avco Corp. v. Machinists, 390 U.S. 557 (1968)).
83. See Taylor, 481 U.S. at 65.
84. Id. at 64. ("[T]he policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain
remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be
completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free to
obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA." (quotations
omitted) (quoting Dedaux, 481 U.S. at 54)).
85. Id. at 66 ("[L]egislative history consistently sets out this clear intention to
make § 502(a)(1)(B) suits brought by participants or beneficiaries federal
questions for the purposes of federal court jurisdiction in like manner as § 301 of
LMRA ... [T]he touchstone of the federal district court's removal jurisdiction is..
the intent of Congress.").
86. See id. at 65-66.
87. See id. at 64.
88. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a) (West 1999).
89. Justice Stevens described section 502 as an "interlocking, interrelated, and
interdependent remedial scheme." Russell, 473 U.S. at 146. See also Dedeaux, 481
U.S. at 54 ("[Tjhe detailed provisions of § 502(a) set forth a comprehensive civil
enforcement scheme that represents a careful balancing of the need for prompt
and fair claims settlement procedures against the public interest in encouraging the
formation of employee benefit plans .... ").
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intended to be exclusive." ''  Despite all of this acclaim, as it has
been interpreted, 502(a) has an extremely limited remedial repertoire.
This restricted range of remedies coupled with 502(a)'s extensive
preemptive power, has made relief for some types of damages
unavailable under both ERISA and state law.91 The Davila case
provides such an example. In Davila, the Court held that ERISA
completely preempted the Texas Health Care Liability Act (THCLA),
which provided a cause of action against a managed care organization
for negligent health care treatment decisions.92 The Court found that
THCLA attempted to provide a remedy not authorized under 502(a). 93
A participant or beneficiary in an ERISA regulated plan cannot sue
under a common law tort theory or a state statute that authorizes
damages that exceed those provided in ERISA.94
The plaintiffs in Davila were given leave by the district court to
amend their complaints in order to state ERISA causes of action, but
they declined to do so. 95 Had they stated ERISA claims, the claims
would have fallen under section 502(a)(1)(B). 96 The Supreme Court
pointed out that Davila and Calad could have paid for the benefits that
their HMOs denied and then sought a recovery of benefits through
ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B). 97 While this was certainly practically
possible, the plaintiff's stood to gain nothing from bringing this type of
suit. The Court has read §502(a)(1)(B) to authorize damages for the
actual benefit lost, not for any consequential damages. Mr. Davila
stood to recover the value of a Vioxx prescription; Ms. Calad, the cost
of one day of inpatient hospitalization. Given the costs associated with
90. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 54.
91. See Davila, 542 U.S. at 222-224 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
92. See Davila, 542 U.S. at 200.
93. See id. at 209..
94. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 54. ("In sum, the detailed provisions of § 502(a) set
forth a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that represents a careful
balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against the
public interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans. The policy
choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of others
under the federal scheme would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan
participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that
Congress rejected in ERISA.").
95. Such inaction led to the district court dismissing the case, followed by
appeals by the plaintiffs. See Davila, 542 U.S. at 205-206.
96. Id. at 214.
97. Id. at 211.
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litigation, it stands to reason that most people will not involve the
federal judiciary over a claim for relatively minimal damages.
A. Supreme Court Cases Defining the Scope of ERISA's Remedial
Scheme
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell was the first case
to consider whether compensatory and punitive damages were
available to plan participants and beneficiaries.9" The plaintiff brought
suit in state court against his plan's administrator for damages related
to the administrator's mishandling of a claim for disability benefits. 9
The defendant removed the case to federal court and motioned for
summary judgment.' °° The district court granted the motion, finding
that ERISA preempted all of the claims derived from state law and
that ERISA prohibited consequential or punitive damages arising out
of the original denial or the subsequent delay in providing benefits.11
The Ninth Circuit agreed that the state law causes of action were
preempted, but held that the plaintiff had alleged a cause of action
under ERISA § section 409(a).1 °2 By taking 132 days to process the
plaintiff's claim, the plan administrator breached his obligation, as a
fiduciary, to process claims "in good faith and in a fair and diligent
manner."
10 3
Section 502(a)(2) permits a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary to
bring a civil action for "appropriate relief" under § 409,' 04 which in turn
grants the court discretion to award "such other equitable or remedial
relief as the court may deem appropriate. '"10 5 The Ninth Circuit
interpreted this language to include compensatory and punitive
damages.1 ' The Supreme Court unanimously overruled the circuit
98. See Russell, 473 U.S. at 136.
99. See id. at 136-37.
100. Id. at 137.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 137-38.
103. Id. at 137, 138
104. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132 (West 1999) (referencing the "appropriate relief" that
an eligible person can seek via civil action "under section 1109").
105. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1109(a) (West 1999).
106. Russell, 473 U.S. at 138.
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court on the ground that 409(a) is directed at recovery of damages by
the plan, not individual participants and beneficiaries.'0 7
The holding in Russell is extremely narrow. The Court addressed
whether 409(a) permitted an individual plan participant or beneficiary
to recover consequential and punitive damages from a fiduciary caused
by the fiduciary's "improper or untimely processing of benefit
claims"'0 8 The respondent in this case made a strategic decision not to
rely on § 502(a)(3)(B). Consequently, the Court had "no occasion to
consider whether any other provision of ERISA authorizes recovery of
extracontractual damages."' 0 9
Four members of the Court joined a concurrence, which was quite
critical of the majority. The concurring opinion faulted the Court for
remarks that it deemed "unnecessary and to some extent completely
erroneous.""0 At least one commentator has suggested that this "bad
start" in interpreting section 502(a)(2) biased the Court against
reading section 502(a)(3) as an approval of consequential and punitive
damages when presented with that issue eight years later."' In the
following case, the Court was asked whether a non-fiduciary could be
held personally liable under section 502(a)(3)'s provision of
"appropriate equitable relief" for his knowing participation in the
breach of a fiduciary duty imposed by ERISA."2
107. Id. at 140 ("[R]ecovery for a violation of § 409 insures to the benefit of the
plan as whole. We find this contention supported by the text of § 409, by the
statutory provisions defining the duties of a fiduciary, and by the provisions
defining the rights of a beneficiary.").
108. Id. at 148.
109. Id. at 139 n.5 (citation omitted). The Court continued to use the term
"extracontractual," which the lower courts had applied, to describe consequential
and punitive damages. At least one commentator has pointed out the prejudicial
effect of the word. See Langbein, supra note 18, at 1346 ("'Extra,' meaning
,outside of' is a word that suggests a bonus, something to which one is not entitled.
. . [T]he term 'extracontractual' is also a misemphasis in the setting of ERISA
remedy law." (footnote omitted)).
110. Russell, 473 U.S. at 155, (Brennan, J., concurring) (The concurrence
criticized the Court's "constrictive judicial role in enforcing ERISA's remedial
scheme ..." particularly with respect to section 502(a)(3).) Moreover, the
concurrence criticized, "dicta in the Court's opinion [] that could be construed as
sweeping more broadly than the narrow ground of resolution set forth above. Id. at
150.
111. See Langbein, supra note 18, at 1342.
112. Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 251, 254-55. (1993)
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Mertens v. Hewitt Associates
Former employees of Kaiser Steel, who participated in the Kaiser
Steel Retirement Plan, brought action against the plan's actuary when
the plan became insolvent. '13  The district court dismissed the
complaint and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.14 The
circuit court determined that the actuary was not a plan fiduciary and
the petitioners did not challenge that holding. "5 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari on the question of "whether ERISA authorizes suits
for money damages against nonfiduciaries who knowingly participate
in a fiduciary's breach of fiduciary duty.",16 Because 502(a)(2) applied
to suits against fiduciaries, the petitioners relied on section 502(a)(3)'s
"other appropriate equitable relief" provision." 7  The Court
commented in dicta that it was unclear whether the actuary had
committed an actionable wrong." 8 The Court, however, assumed,
arguendo, that a wrong had been committed and addressed only what
remedies were available under section 502(a)(3)." 9
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, defined "equitable relief" as
relief that was traditionally available solely in courts of equity, prior to
the fusion of courts of equity with courts of law. 12 The Court went on
to comment that these remedies included injunction, mandamus, and
restitution, but not compensatory damages. '  While acknowledging
that money damages were traditionally available in equity against third
122parties who knowingly participated in a trustee's breach, the Court
determined that this definition was not what Congress meant by
"appropriate equitable relief" under ERISA.'23 Applying principles of
124statutory construction, the Court reasoned that Congress intended"equitable" to actually limit the type of "relief" available under
113. Id. at 250.
114. "[T]he Ninth Circuit affirmed in relevant part." Id. at 251 n.2.
115. Id. at 253.
116. Id. at 251.
117. Mertens 508 U.S. at 252-53.
118. See id. at 254-55. ("No [ERISA] provision explicitly requires
[nonfiduciaries] to avoid participation (knowing or unknowing) in a fiduciary's
breach of fiduciary duty." Id. at 254.)
119. See id. at 254-55.
120. Id. at 256-57 (footnote omitted).
121. Id. at 256.
122. Mertens 508 U.S. at 256.
123. See id. at 257-58.
124. See id. at 257-58. ("We will not read the statute to render the modifier
superfluous." (citation omitted). Id. at 258.).
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502(a)(3). 2 1 It concluded, therefore, that "'[e]quitable' relief must
mean something less than all relief.', 2 6 Based on the Court's previous
interpretation of similar language contained in the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Court held that neither compensatory nor punitive damages
were available under § 502(a)(3). 27
Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson
In 2002, the Court began the process of refining "those categories of
relief that were typically available in equity.' ' 12 8 Janet Knudson was
severely injured in an automobile accident in 1992 and was covered
under health insurance provided by her husband's employer, Earth
Systems, Inc. 29 Earth Systems, in turn, was covered by a stop-loss
insurance policy 30 that it purchased from the defendant, Great-West
Life & Annuity Insurance Co. (Great-West).' The policy paid the
first $75,000 in medical expenses at which time Great-West became
obligated under its contract to pay any remaining expenses. Ms.
Knudson's total medical costs exceeded $400,000.11
The Knudsons first brought a tort action in state court against
various parties alleged to be liable for Ms. Knudson's injuries.'33 The
parties negotiated and the state court approved a settlement, which
allocated $13,828.70 to Great-West for its past medical expenses.134
Upon receiving a copy of the settlement agreement, Great-West filed
suit in federal court "seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under §
502(a)(3) to enforce the reimbursement provision of the Plan by
125. Id. at 257.
126. Id. at 258 & n.8.
127. See Mertens 508 U.S. at 255.
128. Great-West Life & Annuity v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002) (citation
omitted).
129. Id. at 207.
130. Graydon S. Staring, Law of Reinsurance, § 2:7, http://www.westlaw.com
(subscription for database required) ("[S]top loss insurance deals with what we
might call spectacularly unhappy coincidences that result in unusually heavy loss in
a given year. These pay a high percentage of unusually high losses in a certain class
of business and may be set up to operate either when the loss ratio of the reinsured
reaches a certain level or when the reinsured's total retentions, after other




134. Great-West. 534 U.S. at 207-208.
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requiring the Knudsons to pay the Plan $411,157.11 . *.". ."' The
district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment,
holding that the language of the policy limited it to recovery of
$13,828.70 for past medical expenses. 136 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed on other grounds.'37
The Supreme Court turned to Mertens for the definition of
"equitable relief."1 38 Mertens held that equitable relief in the context of
section 502(a)(3) is relief that was typically available in common law
equity.139 Great-West contended that the relief it sought was equitable
because injunctive relief was typically available in equity. 140 The Court
scrutinized the underlying character of the relief sought and found it to
be no more than a demand for payment of money owed because of a
breeched legal duty.14 ' The Court found that "an injunction to compel
the payment of money past due under a contract... [,] ..." was not the
type of relief typically available in equity. 
142
Great-West further asserted that it was merely seeking restitution, a
form of equitable relief. 43  The Court, however, distinguished
equitable and legal restitution.' 44 Equitable restitution does not impose
liability, rather it involves a claim that one party holds particular funds
that, in good conscience, belong to another. 45 Legal restitution, on the
other hand, is a judgment that imposes a personal liability upon a
135. Id. at 208.
136. See id. at 208-209.
137. Id. at 209. The Ninth Circuit "held that judicially decreed reimbursement
for payments made to a beneficiary of an insurance plan by a third party is not
equitable relief and is therefore not authorized by § 502(a)(3)." Id.
138. See id. at 209-210.
139. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 257-58.
140. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210-211.
141. Id. at 210.
142. Id. at 210-211. For a critique of the Court's analysis of "traditional
equitable remedies," see Langbein, supra note 18. Professor Langbein notes that,
"[t]here was no law of restitution before fusion [of law and equity], only quasi-
contract and constructive trust." Id. at 1357. He goes on to say that " mandamus..
never pertained to the courts of equity." Id.
143. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 212.
144. Id. at 212. "[R]estitution is a legal remedy when ordered in a case at law
and an equitable remedy.., when ordered in an equity case, and whether it is legal
or equitable depends on the basis for [the plaintiff's] claim and the nature of the
underlying remedies sought." Id. at 213. (quotations and citation omitted).
145. Seeid. at 214.
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defendant as to pay a sum of money.146 Great-West was essentially
asking the Court to compel the respondents to pay a sum of money
that the Court described as "the classic form of legal relief.'
147
The holdings in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West were a blow to
ERISA remedy law and invoked wide criticism. The Court, in the end,
found that monetary consequential damages, a traditional trust law
remedy, were not "typical" in courts of equity, raising the question of
whether a plaintiff could ever obtain section 502(a)(3)'s grant of "other
appropriate equitable relief.'
148
PART IV. ERISA REMEDIES IN THE CONTEXT OF MANAGED CARE
The delivery of health care has changed dramatically since ERISA
was enacted in 1973. While most ERISA plans were based on a fee for
service model in the seventies, today most are managed care plans.1
49
Fee for service plans placed physicians and patients in the role of
health care decision makers whereas insurers were merely a payer of150
care. Managed care plans (MCO) usually perform the functions of
both payer and provider of health care, thus creating a new paradigm
for the courts. ' The 1990s were marked with cases brought by
beneficiaries claiming that they were injured by the negligent decisions
of their health maintenance organizations. Negligence in the context
of managed care raised a new set of issues under ERISA: Who is a
fiduciary under ERISA? What duties does a fiduciary have in a MCO
setting?
Pegram v. Herdrich
In 2000, the Court considered the meaning of "fiduciary" in the
context of an HMO. Cynthia Herdrich was covered by an HMOthrough her husband's employer.5 3 The HMO was operated as a for-
146. Id. at 213.
147. Id. at 210 (citing Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255 (emphasis in original)).
148. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256-258.
149. For a brief discussion of fee for service models and HMOs, see Pegram, 530
U.S. at 218-219 (2000).
150. See Russell Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudence of Managed Care, and
How to Fix It: Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption, 51 UCLA L. REV. 457, 462
(2003).
151. See id. & n.14.
152. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 218.
153. Id. at 215.
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profit business by physicians who were also the owners.5 4 Herdrich
went to Dr. Pegram, the defendant and a physician-owner of the
HMO, complaining of groin pain."' Dr. Pegram found the painful area
to be noticeably inflamed and ordered an ultrasound examination, to
be performed at an HMO-staffed facility more than fifty miles away.16
Moreover, the facility was unable to perform the procedure for eight
days.'57 Nonetheless, the doctor did not find the plaintiff's condition
severe enough to merit ordering the ultrasound at a local hospital.
Prior to the ultrasound, Herdrich's appendix ruptured causing severe
infection.
5 8
Herdrich sued Pegram and the HMO "in state court for medical
malpractice [and] . . . state law fraud."'59  The HMO and Pegram
removed the case to federal court where the court granted Herdrich
leave to amend her complaint.'60 In the amended complaint, Herdrich
alleged that the HMO created an incentive for its physicians to limit
care and that provision of medical care under the HMO's incentive
structure constituted "an inherent or anticipatory breach of an ERISA
fiduciary duty. ,,161 She based her claim on ERISA section 409 and
asked that the HMO's profits be returned to the plan.6 2 The district
court granted defendant's motion to dismiss and Herdrich appealed. 63
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that
the HMO was acting as a fiduciary when it made the decision to delay
the ultrasound exam.164
The Supreme Court began by clarifying the meaning of "fiduciary"





158. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 215.
159. Id. The medical malpractice suits were tried and Herdrich prevailed against
the physician and the HMO. Id. at 217.
160. See id. at 215-16.
161. Id. at 216.
162. Id. at 217.
163. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 217.
164. Id. at 217-18. The Seventh Circuit noted that incentives can, but do not
automatically, give rise to a breach of fiduciary duty. Here, the physician delayed
care for the sole purpose of increasing the monetary bonus. See id.
165. Id.
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capacity of manager, administrator, or financial adviser to a 'plan[.] ' '' 6
While acting as a fiduciary, an individual must discharge his duties
"solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries.', 161
Herdrich argued that, as an employee of the HMO charged with
making decisions about access to care, Pegram was a fiduciary. The
Court found that Dr. Pegram, although a fiduciary, was only liable to
the extent that she caused injury to Herdrich while "performing a
fiduciary function.
'1 68
Next, the Court distinguished "eligibility" and "treatment"
decisions. Eligibility decisions are based on whether the plan
provides coverage for a particular condition whereas treatment
decisions entail choices about how to diagnose or treat a condition.
70
A physician's decision to delay care, based on her best medical
judgment, is a mixed treatment and eligibility decision. 7'
The Court differentiated between traditional fiduciary decisions and
the types of decisions physicians make in a for-profit HMO.7 2 Private
trustees of medical or healthcare trusts, for example, do not make
treatment judgments, while physicians make mixed eligibility and
treatment decisions, by definition.'73 Such is the case because private
trustees make decisions about purchasing healthcare, whereas an
ERISA fiduciary, who is also a physician-healthcare provider, may
make treatment and payment decisions. 174  Similarly, an ERISA
fiduciary may have financial interests adverse to beneficiaries, whereas
a common-law trustee in traditional trust law could not.175 Finally, the
Court analyzed the impact of subjecting physician's treatment and
eligibility decisions to a traditional fiduciary standard. 176 The Court
seemed to be swayed by public policy concerns, noting that a finding in
favor of Herdrich would subject the federal courts to greater case loads
and put nonprofit as well as for-profit HMOs in jeopardy. 177
166. Id. at 222.
167. Id. at 223. (citing 29 U.S.C § 1104(a)(1)).
168. Id. at 225-26.
169. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 228.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 229-30.
172. See id. at 231 -232.
173. Id. at 232.
174. Id. at 231 -232
175. Id. at 225. ("Under ERISA [] a fiduciary may have financial interests
adverse to beneficiaries.")
176. See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 236.
177. See id. at 233,233 n.1, 235-36.
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After Pegram, lower courts that applied its principles reached
178 17'opposing conclusions. The Eleventh Circuit, 7 Fifth Circuit, and
Second Circuit 180 classified HMO decisions as "mixed eligibility-
treatment" decisions, not preempted by ERISA. The Third Circuit,
however, found that a similar medical decision was completely
preempted by ERISA. 181 In 2004, the United States Supreme Court
accepted Aetna v. Davila, the case that resolved these disputes
between the circuit courts. 82
Aetna v. Davila
Juan Davila and Ruby Calad brought suit under the Texas Health
Care Liability Act, which imposed a duty on HMOs to exerciseS • - 183
ordinary care when making treatment decisions. Their respective
HMOs had denied benefits for medication, in the case of Davila, and
for in-patient hospitalization, in the case of Calad.'8 In one of the
lower court decisions that the Court consolidated for Davila, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that the HMOs made mixed eligibility-treatment
decisions, which, under Pegram, were not preempted by ERISA.85
The Supreme Court reversed, taking the view that HMO coverage
decisions were pure eligibility decisions, and holding that a
determination of benefits under ERISA is an ordinary fiduciary
responsibility related to the administration of a plan.' The fact that a
178. See Land v. CIGNA Healthcare, 339 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2003), vacated,
CIGNA Healthcare v. Land, 542 U.S. 933 (2004) (remanded in light of Davila, 542
U.S. 200). (HMO's approval nurse who failed to authorize in-patient hospital stay
made a mixed treatment-eligibility decision.).
179. See Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2002), rev'd, Davila, 542
U.S. 200.
180. See Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83 (2nd Cir. 2003), vacated, Vytra Healthcare v.
Cicio, 542 U.S. 933 (2004). (HMO's decision to deny preauthorization for a
medical procedure recommended by the treating physician was a mixed eligibility-
treatment decision.).
181. See DiFelice v. Aetna, 346 F.3d 442 (3rd Cir. 2003). (Plaintiff's claim that
Aetna "interfered with" his medical treatment by declaring the special tube
"medically unnecessary" is preempted by ERISA because it could have been
brought as an action under section 502(a). See id. at 448.).
182. See Davila, 542 U.S. 200.
183. Id. at 205.
184. See id. at 204-205.
185. Roark, 307 F.3d at 307.
186. See Davila, 542 U.S. at 218-219.
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benefits decision involves "medical judgments" does not by itself
181change the fiduciary nature of the act.
The Court distinguished Pegram, where the decision to delay
treatment was made by a physician employed by the HMO and not an
HMO administrator. Pegram applies only where the treating physician
is also the person charged with administering benefits.'8 Here, the
petitioners were "neither [the] treating physicians nor the employers of
[the] treating physicians. 189
The unanimous Court, emphasized the fact that plaintiffs had the
option of paying for the denied treatment. 19 Had they done so, they
could have subsequently brought a claim for denied benefits under
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). Reasoning from this point, the Court
concluded that the plaintiffs' claims for damages were essentially
section 501(a)(1)(B) claims and thus completely preempted by
ERISA."'9
With Davila, the Court seems to be imposing a duty to mitigate on a
party whose HMO denies or delays medically necessary care. While
mitigation might have been possible for the Davila plaintiffs, due to
the relatively low cost of the denied benefits, it would not be practical
in many foreseeable cases. The Court's holding is troubling in two
ways. First, it will result in a bifurcated standard of care. Patients that
can afford to pay out of their own pockets for medically necessary care
that has been denied will receive the care they need and then be
reimbursed. Those who cannot afford this option will not receive
needed care and will be damaged. Under Davila, this latter group of
patients, arguably those who are the neediest will have no real remedy.
Second, the mandate to HMO patients to pay out of their own funds
and recoup the costs later creates an adverse incentive for HMOs. If
the most that a patient can recover is the cost of the care, the HMO
has nothing to lose in deciding to deny or delay care.'9 2
187. Id. at 219.
188. Id. at 221.
189. Id. at 221.
190. Id. at 211. ("It is clear, then, that respondents complain only about denials
of coverage promised under the terms of ERISA-regulated employee benefit
plans. Upon the denial of benefits, respondents could have paid for the treatment
themselves and then sought reimbursement through a § 502(a)(1)(B) action, or
sought a preliminary injunction .... (citation omitted)).
191. Id. at 214.
192. DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 453-54 ("[E]xisting ERISA jurisprudence creates a
monetary incentive for HMOs to mistreat those beneficiaries, who are often in the
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PART V. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S HOLDINGS,
DISCUSSION OF REMEDIES STILL AVAILABLE TO
BENEFICIARIES
ERISA was enacted primarily for the benefit of employees.' 93 Over
the years, it has evolved into more of an obstacle than an advantage to
plaintiffs seeking redress for employee-benefit- plan-related injuries.' 94
In Davila, Justice Ginsburg described the problem:
Because the Court has coupled an encompassing interpretation of
ERISA's preemptive force with a cramped construction of the
"equitable relief" allowable under § 502(a)(3), a "regulatory vacuum"
exists: "[V]irtually all state law remedies are preempted but very few
federal substitutes are provided.'
9 5
Commentators have suggested that the effect of thirty years of
judicial interpretation has so removed ERISA from what Congress
intended that nothing short of congressional action will remedy the
situation. 96 Perhaps Congress will accept the challenge, but in the
meantime plaintiffs must contend with the "state of ERISA" as it
exists today. While many remedies are simply unavailable, plan
participants and beneficiaries still have some options. This section
explores the avenues that might still be open to beneficiaries damaged
by a managed care organization's denial of benefits.
A. Narrowing ERISA's preemptive power
The Supreme Court has moved away from its original expansive
reading of section 514's "relate to" language and now considers a state
law to relate only if it operates directly on the structure or
administration of ERISA plans.' 9' Under this interpretation, more
state statutory and common law claims remain in the control of state
courts. A continuing trend in this direction would further the interests
of plaintiffs by keeping them out of federal court where state claims
are pre-empted.
throes of medical crises and entirely unable to assert what meager rights they
possess.")
193. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 262-63 (citation omitted).
194. DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 453 (Becker, C.J. concurring) ("ERISA has evolved
into a shield that insulates HMOs from liability for even the most egregious acts of
dereliction committed against plan beneficiaries .... ").
195. Davila, 542 U.S. at 222, (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
196. See DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 453 (Becker, C.J. concurring).
197. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
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The "saving clause" of section 514 provides another means for states
to retain jurisdiction over claims where a plaintiff alleges injuries
resulting from a violation of a law that "regulates insurance.
1 9 8
Although initially construed quite narrowly,199 the Court has recently
invoked the saving clause to save state laws that require plans to cover
a particular medical treatment or the services of a specified care
provider.2
An example of such a law is Kentucky's Any Willing Provider
statute ("AWP"), which prevents health insurers from discriminating
against any "provider . . .who is willing to meet the terms and
conditions for participation established by the health insurer
provider., 20 1  Several HMOs filed suit against the Commissioner of
Kentucky's Department of Insurance, claiming that ERISA preempted
202the AWP statute. The U. S. Supreme Court did not question
whether the law related to ERISA regulated health plans.201 It
198. See supra Part I p. 8.
199. Prior to 2003, the Court applied factors from the McCarran-Ferguson Act
to determine whether a state law regulated insurance. Miller, 538 U.S. at 339. The
result was that few laws met the criteria to be saved from ERISA preemption. Id.
(Our prior decisions construing § 1144(b)(2)(A) have relied, to varying degrees, on
our cases interpreting §§ 2(a) and 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. In
determining whether certain practices constitute 'the business of insurance' under
the McCarran-Ferguson Act (emphasis added), our cases have looked to three
factors: 'first, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a
policyholder's risk; second, whether the practice is an integral part of the policy
relationship between the insurer and the insured; and third, whether the practice is
limited to entities within the insurance industry.' Pireno, 458 U.S. at 129.).
200. Id. at 341-42
(Today we make a clean break from the McCarran-Ferguson factors and hold that
for a state law to be deemed a "law ...which regulates insurance" under §
1144(b)(2)(A), it must satisfy two requirements. First, the state law must be
specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance ... Second, as explained
above, the state law must substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement
between the insurer and the insured.).
201. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN § 404.17A-270 (Lexis Nexis 2006) (A health insurer
shall not discriminate against any provider who is located within the geographic
coverage area of the health benefit plan and who is willing to meet the terms and
conditions for participation established by the health insurer, including the
Kentucky state Medicaid program and Medicaid partnerships.)
202. Miller, 538 U.S. at 332-33.
203. The Court acknowledged the district court's determination that the AWP
statute "related to" an ERISA regulated plan, but seemed to pass over that
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assumed that the "relate to" requirement was met, then applied a two
part test to determine whether the statute regulated insurance. The
new test, which replaced the McCarran-Ferguson analysis, requires
that in order to "regulate insurance" the law must be directed at
entities engaged in insurance and must have a substantial affect on risk
pooling24 The Court found the AWP statute to be directed toward
entities engaged in insurance (HMOs) and further found it to
substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement .
The Court has found that a variety of state laws "regulate insurance"
and consequently are saved from preemption.2 °6 It could apply this
reasoning to state statutes that impose a standard of care on HMO
decisions and thereby save state law claims. Davila, however, suggests
this is not likely to be a direction the Court will take. 207 Davila
virtually read the saving clause out of ERISA. While acknowledging
that the Texas Health Care Liability Act was a law governing
insurance, the Davila Court simply gave more weight to its prior
interpretation of ERISA's civil enforcement scheme than it gave to the
208plain language of the savings clause.
B. Expanding ERISA's Remedial Scheme
By choosing the particular options for relief provided in its three
subsections, Congress endowed section 502(a) with the structure and
209substance of traditional trust remedy law. Moreover, the legislative
record demonstrates that Congress intended the courts to apply the
210remedial law of trusts to ERISA. In a statement before the House ofRepresentatives introducing the Conference Committee Report,
question. See id. at 333. Instead, the Court's analysis began with the issue of
whether the law regulated insurance under § 1144(b)(2)(A). Id. at 334.
204. Id. at 342.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 335. (citing FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 355 (2002) (A law that
prevented health care insurers from subrogating against a beneficiary's tort
recovery "regulated insurance"); Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S.
355 (2002) (A law providing that where an HMO denied the medical necessity of a
proposed plan of treatment, it had to obtain a concurring independent review in
order to deny coverage)).
207. See Davila, 542 U.S. at 209.
208. See id.
209. Langbein, supra note 18 at 1331 ("[T]the drafters wanted to apply rules
and remedies similar to those under traditional trust law to govern the conduct of
fiduciaries." (quotation and footnote omitted)).
210. See Langbein, supra note 18, at 1331 n.7.
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Congressman Al UlIman, chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee, stated that "Title I of ERISA provides rules and remedies
similar to those under traditional trust law to govern the conduct of
fiduciaries., 21 1 In the Senate, Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., Chair
of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, echoed similar
sentiments concerning ERISA, explaining that the "objectives of these
provisions are to make applicable the law of trusts ... and to provide
effective remedies for breaches of trust.,
212
Commenting on evidence in the congressional record and the
structure of 502(a), Professor John Langbein concludes that Congress
intentionally constructed section 502(a) to embody principles of trust
law."' Trust remedies include the "make-whole standard of relief,"
namely the provision of direct and consequential damages necessary to
114
make an injured party whole.
The connection between common law trust remedies and ERISA is
apparent from the text of section 502(a).2 5  Trust law allows a
beneficiary who has sustained losses as a result of the trustee's breach
to sue for three types of damages. First, a beneficiary may be
216
compensated for losses resulting from the breach. This corresponds
to section 502(a)(1)'s authorization of recovery for "benefits due.
2 17
Second, a trust beneficiary may recover any profits the trustee made
218
from the breach. This correlates with section 502(a)(2) and section
409, which provide a remedy for losses to the health plan.219 Third,
section 502(a)(3) entitles a beneficiary to compensation for foregone
gains, that is, gains that would have accrued had it not been for the
220breach. Under trust law, a trustee who breaches his duty to manage
and protect trust assets may be required to make monetary
compensation to trust beneficiaries."' Similarly, 502(a)(3)'s "other
appropriate equitable relief" provision should provide a 'safety net' for
injuries not otherwise compensable under 502(a).222
211. Id at 1331 n.77 (citing 120 CONG. REc. 29,198, 29,200 (1974)).
212. Id. (citing 120 CONG. REC. 29,928-29,929, 29,932 (1974)).
213. Id. at 1364-66.
214. Id. at 1319.
215. Langbein, supra note 18, at t333-38.
216. Id. at 1333.
217. Id. at 1334.
218. ld. at 1333.
219. See id. at 1334-35.
220. Id. at 1333.
221. Langbein, supra note 18, at 1336.
222. Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 512.
Eligibility, Treatment, Something In Between
A cursory reading of the Court's three opinions that interpret
ERISA's remedial scheme suggest that the possibility of money as a
form of "other appropriate equitable relief" has been foreclosed.
However, each of these cases had either unique facts or an unusual
procedural history such that they cannot necessarily be extended
beyond their narrow holdings. In Russell, the beneficiary relied on the
wrong subsection of 502(a).223  Thus the Court's holding, that a
fiduciary's breach does not entitle the injured beneficiary to
consequential and punitive damages, applied only to section 409(a).224
225The holding in Mertens applied only to nonfiduciaries. In Mertens,
the Court held that ERISA § 502(a)(3) permits relief traditionally
221
available in equity but does not permit recovery of money damages.
Great-Life applied to a beneficiary whom the plan alleged was
contractually obligated to reimburse the plan for monies paid out on
her behalf, to the extent that she received money damages in
settlement of her tort claims. The Court held that a party
empowered to bring an action under 502(a)(3) "could [only] seek
restitution in equity ....,228
None of these cases addressed section 502(a)(3) with respect to a
fiduciary, thus the option of recovering money damages against a
breaching fiduciary remains open. 22' The United States, in its amicus
brief in Davila, suggested this possibility:
223. Beneficiary brought action under section 502(a)(2) which relates to section
409(a) and is applicable only to compensation for damages to the plan. See
Russell, 473 U.S. at 148. "This case presents a single, narrow question: whether the
§ 409 'appropriate relief' referred to in § 502(a)(2) includes individual recovery by
a participant or beneficiary of extra-contractual damages for breach of fiduciary
duty.". Id. at 149 (Brennan, J., concurring).
224. See id. at 148.
225. See Mertens, 508 U.S. 248. See also supra Part III pp.19-21.
226. See Mertens, 508 U.S. 248. See also supra Part III pp.19-21.
227. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 208. See also supra Part III pp.21-23..
228. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 213. The Court described equitable restitution as,
"ordinarily in the form of a constructive trust or an equitable lien, where money or
property identified as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff could clearly be
traced to particular funds or property in the defendant's possession." Id.
229. See Sarah Beth Spisich, The Aftermath of Davila: Are Healthcare Enrollees
Now in a Sinking Ship Without a Paddle?, 17 HEALTH LAWYER 22,26 (2005). See
also AM. BAR ASS'N, SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS LAW 946 (2d ed. 2000)
(The Supreme Court has not addressed whether punitive damages are available to
plan participants in actions under other subsections of Section 502, or in a Section
502(a)(2) action filed on behalf of the plan by beneficiaries, fiduciaries, or the
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Recognizing that "this Court has construed Section 502(a)(3) not to
authorize an award of money damages against a non-fiduciary," the
Government suggests that [ERISA], as currently written and
interpreted, may "allo[w] at least some forms of 'make-whole' relief
against a breaching fiduciary in light of the general availability of such
relief in equity at the time of the divided bench.
230
Unless, and until, the Supreme Court construes section 502(a)(3)
otherwise, beneficiaries should encourage the federal courts to accept
the Court's characterization of this section as a "catchall 23' and use it
to develop a body of federal common law. Noting the structure of
section 502(a), Justice Bryer observed: "This structure suggests that
these 'catchall' provisions act as a safety net, offering appropriate




Congress enacted ERISA out of concern for beneficiaries of
employment related benefit plans. Over time, however, the Supreme
Court limited the protective nature of ERISA often leaving damaged
beneficiaries will little or no recourse. Nonetheless, the Court has not
foreclosed all means of making plaintiffs who are injured by ERISA-
regulated plans whole. Federal courts remain free to interpret the
savings clause in a manner that limits ERISA's preemptive range.
Additionally, the possibility of monetary damages for breach of
fiduciary duties remains a viable remedial option.
Given Congress' intent to provide a remedy for beneficiaries of
employment related benefit plans injured by acts or decisions of plan
fiduciaries; its intent to model ERISA's civil enforcement scheme after
trust law; given the underlying public policy considerations supporting
an expanded reading of ERISA remedies and the possibility of money
damages against fiduciaries in breach, federal courts should seize the
opportunity to develop a federal common law of remedies consistent
with these goals. Unless courts use the avenues still available to
Secretary of Labor. However, since Russell and Mertens, the majority of lower
courts have confirmed that neither compensatory nor punitive damages are
recoverable in any ERISA claim under Section 502. (footnote omitted)).
For cases where lower courts held that compensatory and punitive damages are
not available under ERISA section 502, see id. at 946 & n.369.
230. Davila, 542 U.S. at 223 (Ginsburg, J. concurring) (emphases added)
(citation omitted).
231. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489,512 (1996).
232 1d. at 512.
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compensate those injured by ERISA regulated plans, plaintiffs will
continue to look for creative ways to circumvent existing preemption
law.
